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I
Because the individual sections of The Sound and the Fury are not in-
telligible in themselves, readings of this novel depend on the complex inter-
play between the sections. For this reason, the analytical approach generally
brought to bear on this novel can analyze, in its most successful applica-
tion, only the critical or fictional synthesis into which its individual sec-
tions have been read. Yet studies of The Sound and the Fury that proceed
from section to section, like those of Olga Vickery or Wolfgang Iser,
or that concentrate on one section alone, like that of George Stewart and
Joseph Backus, give the mistaken impression that the significance of the
novel is the sum of four independently meaningful parts, individually
calculated and added up.
Analyses of The Sound and the Fury generally refer to the relationship
among the sections only in order to characterize the development of the
novel as a whole. The novel is most often said to shift, particularly with
the fourth section, from obscurity to clarity, from privacy to universality,
or from subjectivity to objectivity. Describing this development, AndrÃ©
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Bleikasten writes, "No longer constrained to adopt the narrowly limited
viewpoint of an idiot or the distorted vision of a neurotic, we can at last
stand back and take in the whole scene" (176); Wolfgang Iser holds that
"the identical world of the Compson brothers [is released] from the first-
person point of view" (151); Olga Vickery argues that the novel "emergefs]
from the closed world of the Compson Mile into the public world as
represented by Jefferson" (46); and Cleanth Brooks, in a more florid vein,
claims that we "break into the sunlight of the worldÂ—an objective
world. . . . Here the solipsism of the private world is expanded into
something communal" (25). Yet these assumptions about liberation and
enlightenment, about the novel's progress from obscurity to clarity, from
privacy to publicity, or from subjectivity to objectivity are assumptions
less about the novel than about the nature of signification in general.
Signification itself is at stake in the development of The Sound and
the Fury, as Michael Millgate has recognized. He notes that the final sec-
tion "forces us to view some aspects of the earlier sections in a radically
different way" and that "meaning proves on closer inspection to dissolve
into uncertainty and paradox" (Millgate 167-171). The development of
the novel, or, in other words, the interplay among its parts, is crucial,
then, because it represents the level of the text on which meaning at once
emerges and dissolves. To address this level of the novel is to confront
the uncertainty and paradox of one's own claims about its meaning.
The sort of analysis that has dominated the criticism of this novel
confines itself to the semantic level of the text. The syntax of the novel
is either condemned as fragmentary and hence flawed or salvaged in a
proposition concerning the novel's "development." Yet the syntactic level
of the text is not easily extricated from the meaningful, semantic level.
In predominantly semantic readings, the peculiar disposition or arrange-
ment of the novel returns, like the repressed, as evidence of an evasion.
By articulating a reading according to the novel's most apparent
itinerary or architecture, one may appear to have left the stubbornly
divided form of the work pure and intact. Yet the manifest allegiance
of section-by-section analyses to the objective form of the work becomes
a meaningless and empty gesture, which merely uses form as a ready-
made, pigeon-holed container for self-presentation. Such presentations fail
to acknowledge the fact that the significance they attribute to each osten-
sibly independent section comes belatedly and from without, that the sec-
tions in themselves are largely unintelligible, and that what appears to
ameliorate this discomfiting absence of meaning is the play of relations
among the individual sections. To represent the dynamics of this novel
as a genetic development is not only to reduce a structure productive of
countless possible meanings to one decisive meaning and form; it is also
to deny the divagations, the sine qua non, of reading The Sound and the Fury.
How have the sections of the novel been traditionally marked off from
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and related to one another? Readers mark the four original sections of
the novel off from one another chronologically, according to the date that
entitles each part, and perspectivally, according to each narrator. The first
section of the original text is thus taken to represent the point of view
of Benjy and to take place on April 7, 1928; the next section, the point
of view of Quentin on June 2, 1910; and the next, that of Jason on April
6, 1928. The last section is understood to take place on April 8, 1928,
but the character of its narrator is not explicit. This narrator has generally
been characterized as omniscient, neutral, objective, or, at the very least,
less subjective, as Margaret Blanchard points out, before arguing that
the narrator of the fourth section is a figure for an ideal or, in other
words, acutely perceptive reader (555, 557). This figure must be com-
pared, at any rate, with the narrator of the appendix, "a sort of bloodless
bibliophile . . . [who] knew only what the town could have told him,"
as Faulkner suggested (Cowley 44). What kind of reader is this bibliophile,
who is able to cover, as well as cover up, more than two centuries' time?1
Let us first examine the identification of the sections with the perspec-
tives or points of view of their narrators, by means of which readers evade
numerous crises of uncertainty. Many readers presume that although on
the one hand the multiplication of points of view makes it impossible to
see the novel as a whole from any single point of view, the singular perspec-
tive of each section, on the other hand, offers the view of a single unified
whole. Because each section represents a different point of view, it is hastily
reasoned that each of these sections must constitute a unity of perspec-
tive. That the first three sections are cast as soliloquies encourages readers
to identify these sections with the subject, particularly with consciousness
and with all that has been traditionally thought under its name, that is
to say, identity, presence, unity, autonomy, and so on. Because the iden-
tification of the first three sections with the characters that narrate them
is endemic to the criticism of this novel, I cannot exhaustively describe
but rather can illustrate the extent of its consequences.
In a study noted for its attention to the formal structures of this novel,
Irena Kaluza states that her aim is to "describe the linguistic structures
of The Sound and the Fury in formal categories, that is, . . . objectively,
and then to find out whether they form a meaningful artistic system in
the novel" (8). Kaluza, however, restricts her study of linguistic struc-
tures to those that represent "stream-of-consciousness" or, in other words,
"mental processes" (8), because, as she notes, her reading has been
"moulded" by Vickery, "who treats the four-part structure of the novel
as representative of four ways of perceiving experience, dramatizing the
'Faulkner often dated the "present" in his novels to coincide with the time of writing: thus,
"1928" in the section titles coincides with the year in which he wrote The Sound and the Fury, and "194-5,"
as the outside date in the title of the appendix,  is the year in which he wrote the appendix.
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progression from a private to a public world" (41). Having decided that
the linguistic structures under study correspond to private "ways of
perceiving experience," Kaluza must first of all entirely exclude the fourth
section and the appendix from consideration. But then, too, she must
exclude from the first three sections whatever material cannot be con-
strued as a way of "perceiving experience." Thus, based on the argument
that they are "traditional narrative devices" or "directly quoted ut-
terances" (44), as opposed to representations of Benjy's stream of con-
sciousness, Kaluza omits from her study, according to her own calcula-
tion, seventy-seven percent of the sentences in the first section. Following
the same logic, she excludes from her study of the second and third sec-
tions, respectively, "all sentences between two quotation marks ... as
well as the accompanying narrative routine units of the 'he-said' type"
and "all direct utterances contained between two quotation marks" (61,
92).
Kaluza's criterion for separating each narrator's "own" language from
"mere" citation or from what she considers a narrative "routine" or
"device" underlines the problem raised by the application of such broad
and unthought formalistic categories to these sections. As her systematic
exclusions point out, the first three sections do not simply or even primarily
represent single voices,  perceptions of experience,  or perspectives.
If such readings reduce the differences of which the first three sec-
tions are composed to representations of each narrator as a consciousness,
they quickly reach their limits. Whereas systematic omissions make it possi-
ble to characterize these sections as "interior monologues," as unities
in the form of human subjects, the critic cannot turn to the subject, to
character, or to consciousness as a way of accounting for the manners
in which the monologues interrelate. Because the monologues are not com-
municated but uttered in the silence of mental soliloquy, even a model
of intersubjectivity is unable to explain what motivates the interaction
of the first three sections of the novel. Criticism that refashions the text
in the mold of the subject is unable to account for these relations; never-
theless, it employs them in the form of an idealized network of intersub-
jective relations upon which, in lieu of the literary work, it passes
judgment.
Interpretations that identify the first three sections with their nar-
rators are embarrassed by the fourth section of the novel. Unlike the nar-
rators of the "monologues," who are also characters in the novel, the
shadowy, anonymous narrator of the fourth section, rather like the nar-
rator of the appendix, hovers in a space and time, that is. in a "world"
that the novel does not represent. This embarrassment is turned to ad-
vantage when critics argue that the lofty perspective of this otherworldly
narrator sees beyond the limited perspectives represented in the monologues
and in this manner bridges or relates the monologues to one another.
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As such a medium of totalization and dissolution, the narrative of the
fourth section is typically described as broader in scope, explanatory, and
clarifying.2 In other words, although the fourth section frustrates the
totalization of the sections on the grounds of narrative perspective, it is
recuperated as the perspective that unites all singular perspectives, dissolv-
ing their differences in a higher totality.
Although the novel puts in play the conservative intentions of point
of view (self-presence, continuity, unity, autonomy, exclusion of difference,
purity, and so on), as well as those of genealogy (lineage, breeding, con-
tinuity, transmission of value, purity, exclusion of difference, and such),
it challenges rather than confirms their status. Rather than affirming that
such constructs can unite what is disparate, the fourth section separates
itself off from the other sections of the novel and lends them character
through its difference. The appendix, as a genealogical narrative written
from a "bibliophilie" point of view, draws out the character of the other
sections of the novel by pointing out their difference from and incom-
mensurability with simple genealogy.3
Chronology, as I have mentioned, is also invoked to identify and order
the sections. The sections are identified with the dates that serve as their
titles and are thus understood to take place not in the order they are
given but in the sequence their titles can be said to signify: accordingly,
the second section ("June Second 1910") would come "first," the third
section ("April Sixth 1928") would come "second," the first section
("April Seventh, 1928") would come "third," and the fourth section
("April Eighth 1928") would remain "fourth" and last. What disturbs
the simple reshuffling of the sections is that their given order signifies,
if only to signify their difference from chronological order.
The four original sections seem to offer little resistance to such reorder-
ing, but the appendix, which is titled "Appendix. Compson 1699-1945,"
poses a peculiar problem. The dates that appear in the title of the appen-
dix, "1699-1945," which Faulkner wanted typeset like the birth and death
dates on a tombstone, include and exceed the time identified with the
original sections of the novel. By giving this fifth section a three-part titleÂ—
at once appendix, patronym, and time spanÂ—and by wishing to place
the appendix not at the end of the novel but at its beginning, Faulkner
draws out many of the contradictions involved in the relationship between
a title and the text it entitles. With the appendix, it is difficult to assert
that the title establishes the topic and time of the section it entitles.
Although the title of the appendix is related to the titles of the other four
2Even Walter Slatoff, who argues that the fourth section "seems designed not to interpret or
to integrate but to leave the various elements of the story in much the same suspension in which they
were offered," evaluates the final section in terms of its explicatory relation to the previous sections
of the novel (158).
3For a "genealogy" of the appendix and its critique of genealogy, see Lester.
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sections, it does not function according to the same logic. If the punctual
dates of the original sections can be scrambled and restored to chronological
order, where is one to locate a time span that engulfs that order? On
the basis of the dates in its title, the question of whether to place the
appendix first or last is a false question, because neither possibility can
reconcile a span of time with a series of points in time. Because it has
no place in the order the first four sections can be understood to signify,
the appendix is rarely treated as a section in itself but is discussed here
and there, with reservations about its status, to bolster particular inter-
pretations of character or chronological order. But the appendix simply
draws out what the original sections of the novel already suggest: that
is, that this novel opposes itself to the conventional manners in which
temporal difference is signified. To examine the novel from the perspec-
tive of a temporal order is to relinquish the radical form in which it ques-
tions the temporality no less than the spatiality of signification.
A sequential rearrangement of the sections is unable to recognize the
specific differences between the sections, even in terms of temporality alone.
A simple enumeration of the sections in their ' 'proper' ' chronological order
obscures the basic question of why Faulkner eschewed such an order, as
well as a variety of questions raised by the sections' chronological deter-
minations. Why, for example, is the "time" between the sections that
are chronologically first and second (June 2, 1910 and April 6, 1928) so
much greater than that which separates the others (April 6, 7, and 8)?
A chronological reading of the sections has difficulty maintaining the
specific differences between such temporal leaps, and it blurs the fact that
the temporal differences between the chronologically consecutive sections
cannot be expressed as a uniform and formalistic interval. In the order
Faulkner gives them, the first section (April 7) is one day after the third
(April 6), and the third section (April 6) is two days before the fourth
(April 8). But relations of anteriority and posteriority in fact fail to do
justice to these interrelations, for each section, taken on its own terms,
stakes an equal claim on the present and rearranges the others according-
ly. From the perspective of the first section, the third section is the day
before; but from the perspective of the third section, the first section is
the day after. The fact that the sections' titles may refer to more than
one chronological time and to more than one kind of timeÂ—to a span
of time, to a time before or after, to a first or last time, to a consecrated
or a forgotten timeÂ—may explain why the sections are most commonly
referred to in terms of proper names: as the Benjy section, the Quentin
section, the Jason section, and (alas) the fourth section.
Only when the various perspectives raised by the section titles are
eliminated in favor of their referral, above all, to the sections "themselves"
and when all the sections are therefore understood to partake in the single,
146                                                                                 MODERN FICTION STUDIES
common element of chronological time do the section titles offer the prom-
ise of a medium in which all the individual sections might be united.
Time answers to the hope for a form, not quite discovered in consciousness
or point of view, that would bring all the sections together in a single,
homogeneous medium. Yet such a hope can be fulfilled only by subor-
dinating the novel's complex textualization of time to some unthought
notion of Time. In The Sound and the Fury, the essence of time, if that
is to be the name for the medium of provisional totality, is nothing simply
temporal.
Let us examine the section titles one last time, with reference to the
order in which they are given. The only section titles that can be stretched
in place to represent a forward-moving, linear sequence or continuum
are the first (April 7) and fourth (April 8). Yet, this sequence is inter-
rupted by what stands in the space of its unthinkable middle, a middle
or medium without which it could not be a sequence. What comes to
light in this space is curiously incompatible with its apparently formal
logic, precisely because in this middle semantics and syntax collide. What
appears in the middle of this sequence is not the syntactic middle of what
its semantic order suggests; indeed, what could or should there be be-
tween the 7th and the 8th? Conversely, since April 6th appears between
the 7th and the 8th, what appears in the middle of these two dates no
longer functions as a satisfactory semantic middle either, as it would if
it appeared, say, between the 5th and the 7th. In sum, the construction
of a semantic unity invariably opens a middle that exceeds that unity.
Semantic unities are thus inhabited and divided by a space that they can
neither regulate nor do without. This is the sort of "medium" in whose
unruly space and time The Sound and the Fury lets loose its significations.
Because they do not simply add up, line up, or cancel each other
out but articulate their differences, the section titles cannot serve to rear-
range the novel in the temporal order they at once suggest and disrupt.
Like Luster and Benjy, who at the end of the novel double back in disrup-
tion around the statute of a Confederate soldier, a monument to a lost
cause, the section titles circle around time, which Jason pÃ¨re refers to as
"the mausoleum of all hope and desire" (93). Like "point of view," which
hovers like a succubus over the voices through which this novel speaks,
chronology is in no position to account for the fury of referrals or relays
in which it participates and which gives the novel over to the apocryphal
stories they lead us to construct. Measurements such as point of view
and chronology, failing to account for the relays of which they too are
made, can only situate the novel with respect to the very banalities from
which it escapes.
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II
One instance of the sort of illegibility for which TLÂ· Sound and the
Fury is famous occurs toward the end of the first section, when Benjy
turns his gaze upon himself. What Benjy gazes upon when he looks at
himself is unclear: "I got undressed," we read, "and I looked at myself, and
I began to cry." The coincidence of this troubled reaction with Benjy's
sight of himself is immediately remarked by Luster: "Hush, Luster said.
Looking for them aint going to do no good. They're gone" (90). The significance
of Luster's remark is obscure. What, the curious reader must ask, or
who, is it useless to look for? Who or what is gone? For the moment,
at any rate, it does the reader as little good to ask who or what "they"
are as it does Benjy to look for "them."
We can better understand if not explain the puzzles of this passage
by pointing out that the antecedent of the objective and subjective pro-
nouns "them" and "they" has been withheld. Certainly, withheld
antecedents are familiar to readers of Faulkner, especially to those of us
who continue to mull over the dazzling epigraph that introduces Faulkner's
second novel, Mosquitoes, in which the author seems to be writing about
mosquitoes yet never calls them by their name. Aside from arousing our
curiosity and perhaps our irritation, a pronoun that precedes its antece-
dent has something to say about the topography and chronology of
signification.
In the absence of an antecedent, a pronoun is not altogether insignifi-
cant. On the contrary, it signifies that it does not in itself indicate what
it signifies (in opposition to the manner in which a substantive is held
to signify) and, from anyone who cares to know what is intended, it solicits
a question. Instead of referring to something, the pronoun invites the
reader to ask: "To whom or to what are you referring?" The lack of
an antecedent, like a surplus of antecedents, troubles the referring function
of the pronoun, but it does not abolish it. Even in the absence of a
decidable referent, the pronoun refers. "You are referring," we say to
the troublesome pronoun, "but to whom or to what are you referring?" As
any handbook makes clear, and as any writing instructor knows only too
well, it is the proper placement of the antecedent that allows the pronoun
to signify as it should. But in defiance of the grammatical imperative, the
pronouns in Luster's reply signify as they do. Because they refer to no
neighboring word, because their antecedent or referent is not in the area
that precedes them, the reader can only hope to recover their referent
in time.
The question we are left with is whether this pronoun will ever recover
its "antecedent," but the question we have already forgotten is what Benjy
was looking at when he looked at "himself." If I outline a course or
itinerary of referrals leading back to this passage and to the antecedents
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of this passage, I must confess from the outset that the latter question
will never be answered. It is not simply Benjy's gaze at himself that will
lead us back to this passage but the fact that it coincides with Benjy's
ambiguous cries and Luster's ambiguous words. It will never be certain
that what Benjy was looking at when he looked at himself corresponds
to what Benjy began to cry about or to what Luster declared he was look-
ing/or. Indeed, what will lead us back to this passage with its long-since
forgotten ambiguity will be the very question we have declared ourselves
unable to answer: what would Benjy think about when "he'd happen to
take a look at himself?
Because this "backwards" referral comes in the third section, whose
title "April Sixth" might be said to indicate the day before the first
section, we might have to concede that Faulkner's grammar is correct,
after all. The narrator is Jason.
Well at least I could come home one time without finding Ben and that nigger hanging
on the gate like a bear and a monkey in the same cage. Just let it come toward sundown
and he'd head for the gate like a cow for the barn, hanging onto it and bobbing his head
and sort of moaning to himself. That's a hog for punishment for you. If what had happened
to him for fooling with open gates had happened to me, I never would want to see another
one. I often wondered what he'd be thinking about, down there at the gate, watching the
girls going home from school, trying to want something he couldn't even remember he
didn't and couldn't want any longer. And what he'd think when they'd be undressing him
and he'd happen to take a look at himself and begin to cry like he'd do. But like I say
they never did enough of that. I says I know what you need, you need what they did to
Ben then you'd behave. And if you don't know what that was I says, ask Dilsey to tell
you. (315)
Although this passage may begin to "clarify" the passage we discussed
above, it also generates ambiguities in its own right. Which uncertainty
is the reader of this passage to focus uponÂ—wh^t strange composite beast
(caged bear/cow/hog) serves to describe Benjy, what happened to Benjy
for fooling with open gates, what they never did enough of, why Jason,
of all characters, would wonder what Benjy would think, "down there
at the gate" or when "they'd be undressing him and he'd happen to
take a look" at his naked body, or who Jason addresses when he suggests
that "you need what they did to Ben"? Few readers pursue the first and
last questions because, unlike the others, they do not promise to efface
themselves by clarifying other passages memorable for their obscurity.
Few readers choose to puzzle over the odd plurality of animals to which
Benjy is comparedÂ—not only in this passage from the third section but
also in passages from the first section, where Benjy is compared to a hound
because he can smell death (41), and from the fourth, where Benjy is
compared to a "trained bear" (342)Â—because such a menagerie interferes
with the reader's desire to give Benjy's "voice" a "visible form." Nor
do readers question the fact that it is Jason who expresses concern or
at least curiosity about what had happened to Ben. It is by way of Jason
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that we are referred back to two previously unconnected passages: one
in which Benjy looks at himself undressed and the other in which Benjy
"fooled" with the open gate. Jason's remarks newly characterize the
passage in which Benjy fooled with the open gate, baptizing it as the
antecedent of the passage in which Benjy looked at himself and began
to cry. If Jason's remarks "clarify" the relation between these two
passages, they also suggest that Jason may have been the architect of their
relation. Rather than explaining obscurity away, Jason's remarks introduce
new, more sinister obscurities. Still, the reader has become more or less
aware, by way of this overcharged chain of referrals, of what critics refer
to, in sum, as Benjy's castration. He or she finds out even more when,
at the conclusion of the third section, Jason resumes his meditation on
what happened to Benjy.
I could hear the Great American Gelding snoring away like a planing mill. I read somewhere
they'd fix men that way to give them women's voices. But maybe he didn't know what
they'd done to him. I dont reckon he even knew what he had been trying to do, or why
Mr Burgess knocked him out with the fence picket. And if they'd just sent him on to Jackson
while he was under the ether, he'd never have known the difference. But that would have
been too simple for a Compson to think of. Not half complex enough. Having to wait to
do it at all until he broke out and tried to run a little girl down on the street with her
own father looking at him. Well, like I say they never started soon enough with their cut-
ting, and they quit too quick. I know at least two more that needed something like that,
and one of them not over a mile away, either. But then I dont reckon even that would
do any good.  Like I say once a bitch always a bitch. (328-329)
In order to trace this passage back to the passages with which we
are concerned, we must overlook the questions it evokes, questions we
will never be in a position to answer: whether Benjy knew "what" they
had done to him, who "they" are, and which two people, according to
Jason, also needed "something like that." With this passage, the first
section's passages about the open gate are clarified both with respect to
events that "took place" (Benjy "tried to run a little girl down on the
street" and her father, Mr. Burgess, "knocked him out with the fence
picket") and with respect to the castration that results from those events
("Gelding," "they'd fix men that way to give them women's voices,"
"what they'd done to him," "while he was under the ether," "Having
to wait to do it," "they never started soon enough with their cutting").
Nevertheless, this passage does not simply clarify select passages from
the first section of the novel; rather, it allows certain readers the oppor-
tunity to decide upon the significance of passages untranslatable in
themselves. The extent to which these previously unintelligible passages
are affected by Jason's remarks can be illustrated by a summary Edmond
Volpe offers of the passage in which Benjy, as this critic puts it, "assaults
the Burgess girl and is castrated."
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Mr. Compson asks Jason if he had left the gate open. Jason denies it, saving the family
is bad enough without this kind of thing happening. He tells his father that now he will
have to send Benjy to Jackson, that is, if Mr.  Burgess does not shoot the idiot first.
The next scene, beginning "It was open when I touched it" presents Benjy's recollec-
tion of the incident. The school girls know that the gate is always locked, and they stop
to watch Benjy. When the idiot touches the gate, it opens. They run, but he catches one
of them.
This memory merges into the castration operation: "and she screamed and I was trying to
say and trying and the bright shapes began to stop and I tried to get out. I tried to get
it off my face." He is fighting the anesthesia mask, but he breathes in and goes off Î¯Î¿ sleep. (359;
emphasis added)
According to Volpe, Benjy's recollection of the "incident" merges
into "the castration operation," but it is more accurate to say that Volpe's
description of this passage merges with what certain passages from the
third section of the novel allow him to imagine. Yet in order to focus
on the significance of these passages one must of course refer to some other
passage or passages. In order to give significance to a passage whose
referents are either plural or absent, one must locate some "antecedents,"
if you will. One must turn to other passages in which it is identified or
"marked," as Southern farmers say of castrated livestock. Yet the critic
who would in this way mark a passage already marked by its unreadability
ought to acknowledge his or her hand in the operation of castration. Volpe,
for example, fails to acknowledge that he has identified this passage in
a particular manner, excluding not only its own peculiar markings but
also any other manner in which it may be marked. Jason's remarks,
however dramatic their effect, do not exhaust the referrals into which this
passage enters.
Oddly enough, Benjy's "fumbling abortive attempt ... on a pass-
ing female child," as this passage is characterized in the appendix (422),
is situated at a critical juncture of the first section. At this point in the
section, Benjy's movements have come full circle; as at the beginning
of the section, he is at the fence, looking at the golf course "through
the curling flower spaces" (1, 62). What motivates this return to the begin-
ning of the novel? Just before this critical, violent, and confusing "scene,"
Benjy comes upon Caddy's daughter, Quentin, "in the swing" with a
man, and he is reminded of the time he saw Caddy in the swing with
Charlie. Benjy's way of describing this sight, as "two now, and then one
in the swing" (56), suggests a way of describing the operation of referral,
in which otherness leaves its mark. Referral, the swing between two dif-
ferent but related elements, is the most recurrent structure in the novel
and is frequently thematized, as it is in this passage, as a crisis. In such
crises, the characters of The Sound and the Fury do not recognize but rather
suffer the difference between the times and places brought together in
the swing of similarity. Benjy has at this point in the section brought
together two scenes from whose similarity the narrative seems to flee. As
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if to end itself here once and for all, the narrative returns to its begin-
ning. Yet instead of exploiting the closure of such repetition, as the nar-
rative does in both the second and third sections, the first section suffers
its own differences from itself. What "happens" at the open gate marks
the unforeseeable difference of the "same."
The passage at the open gate, in which Benjy sees the girls who
"passed with their booksatchels," refers the reader to the passage in which
Benjy meets Caddy at the gate when she returns from school. In its return
to the "same" place, the narrative emphasizes the violence of difference
or rather of the failure to recognize difference. Let us examine the passage
Jason's remarks in the third section identify as the cause of what "they"
did to Benjy:
I went down to the gate, where the girls passed with their booksatchels. They looked at
me, walking fast, with their heads turned. / tried to say, but they went on, and I went along
the fence, trying to say, and they went faster. Then they were running and I came to the
corner of the fence and I couldn't go any further, and I held to the fence, looking after
them and trying to say.  (63; emphasis added)
The relation of this passage to the passage it attempts to repeat, in which
Benjy meets Caddy at the gate, will enable us to hear this passage's em-
phasis on "trying to say." This phrase draws our attention to the ob-
vious yet nonetheless perplexing paradox of Benjy's voice or point of view,
which is incompatible with his incapacity or incompetency. Benjy expresses
himself only through inarticulate cries, or in their cessation, yet he employs
articulate language in soliloquy. Perhaps the manner in which we under-
stand his soliloquy can be related to the manner in which other characters
in the novel "understand" his inarticulate cries. Through his cries, Luster
understands that Benjy wants to see the golfers, the flowers, or the fire;
Dilsey understands that Benjy smells death; Quentin understands that
Benjy doesn't want Caddy to leave; Caddy understands that Benjy thinks
it is Christmas, that he wants to hold a letter, that he doesn't like the
smell of perfume, and so on. Whether what is understood corresponds
to what Benjy means or whether Benjy knows what he means cannot be
determined with reference to his soliloquy. What is peculiar to the passage
cited above is that Benjy remarks emphatically that he is not crying. In-
stead, Benjy claims, he is "trying to say." Benjy's distinction continues:
It was open when I touched it, and I held to it in the twilight. I wasn ÎŠ crying, and I tried
to stop, watching the girls coming along in the twilight. / wasn ÎŠ crying. ... 7 wasn ÎŠ cry-
ing. . . . They came on in the twilight. I wasn't crying, and I held to the gate. They came
slow. . . . They came on. I opened the gate and they stopped, turning. I was trying to say,
and I caught her, trying to say, and she screamed and I was trying to say and trying and the
bright shapes began to stop and I tried to get out. I tried to get it off of my face, but
the bright shapes were going again. They were going up the hill to where it fell away and
I tried to cry. But when I breathed in, I couldn't breathe oui again to cry, and I tried to keep
from falling off the hill and I fell off the hill into the bright, whirling shapes. (64; emphasis
added)
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To try to understand the difference between crying and trying to say,
we cannot turn to "crying," whose significance is decided in particular
contexts, by particular characters, and in view of particular interests.
Because the significance of Benjy's cries is at once plural and unverifiable,
we cannot determine what Benjy means when he says that he is "not
crying" but "trying to say." Yet the way Caddy greets Benjy at the gate
suggests a way of greeting the ambiguity of this distinction. When Caddy
finds Benjy at the gate, she lets loose a battery of questions:
Did you come to meet me. . . . Did you come to meet Caddy. . . . Did you come to meet
Caddy. . . . What is it. What are you trying to tell Caddy. . . . What is it. . . . What are
you trying to tell Caddy. What is it.  (5-6)
Caddy's questions are remarkable for their tenacity but also because they
lack the punctuation proper to interrogation. In fact, none of the ques-
tions posed in the first section bear the mark of interrogation. Still, because
the distinction between a declarative and interrogative statement in English
is also marked by syntax, we can recognize a question even in the absence
of a question mark. Such recognition is simple on the level of the sentence
but is considerably more difficult on the level of narration. The narrative
is obvious when it forecloses questioning, for example, when Luster points
his interlocuter to Benjy, a mute witness, for verification of this or that
claim (for instance, 82) or when Caddy interjects answers into her
unanswerable interrogation of Benjy, which culminates in a last,
unanswerable question:
What is it. . . . Did you think it would be Christmas when I came home from school. Is
that what you thought.  (6)
But the narrative's interrogative thrust, which characterizes, for example,
the indeterminable distinction between crying and "trying to say" or be-
tween Quentin fille and Caddy in the swing with a man, is more difficult
to acknowledge.
It has been argued that Benjy's repetition of "trying to say" is an
expression of an urgent desire to communicate. Bleikasten writes that "to
speak and be heard [is] the very wish Benjy's monologue is at pains to
fulfill. For is not the entire first section a 'trying to say'?" Is not, Bleikasten
adds, the entire novel a "trying to say" (83)? Bleikasten interprets "try-
ing to say" in terms of both speaking and being heard because, on the
one hand, he cannot be sure which of these very different wishes it refers
to and, on the other hand, he projects onto the passage, the section, and
indeed the entire novel the wish that speaking and being heard would
be the same. But nowhere in The Sound and the Fury is it suggested that
the relation between speaking and being heard, between utterance or
discourse and comprehension or interpretation, tends toward identity, or
even toward a modest felicity. With its congregation of intruding voices
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and sounds, Faulkner's novel affirms nothing so much as the folly and
misery of this desire for an illusory identity in communication.
But why should the fundamental separation of the self from itselfÂ—
whether one chooses to think of this as castration or as trying to sayÂ—
surface at this juncture as a crisis? Why should the question of self-identity
arise here, at a point the first section could have used to fold back over
itself, ending itself in the echo of its beginning, as do the second and
third sections? It is here, in its first self-encompassing circle back upon
itself, returning to "the curling flower spaces" that the first section
discovers that its echoes are not answers but questions. Instead of folding
back over itself as though in answer to itself, the novel at this point gives
itself over to the recombinatory fury of questions multiplied in the echo
of referral. By sustaining referral at the expense of simple reference, as
does a pronoun in the absence, excess, or deferral of its antecedent(s),
by dwelling on the breaking point of designation, language recasts itself
as literature.
When merged with their echoes in the third section, the first sec-
tion's passages at the open gate are translated into the pseudohistorical
cause of Benjy's castration. Yet this "clarification" leads only to other
questions, for it obscurely suggests that this cause, too, has a cause.4 Reluc-
tant to entertain the interrogatives of this narrative, which are directed,
for one thing, at our haste to rectify and dispel its obscurity, placid transla-
tions of The Sound and the Fury obscure this novel's furious repetition of
its own castration and pacify the violence of its particularly literary
affirmation.
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